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he last Minsk agreement on eastern Ukraine failed to bring peace. The latest looks 
similar — but the context has changed. 
The German chancellor, Angela Merkel, called it “no more than a glimmer of hope” 
after all-night negotiations in the Belarus capital, involving the leaders of Russia, France, 
Ukraine and herself, concluded on February 12th. 
Indeed, many of the 13 paragraphs of Minsk II were already in Minsk I of 5 September 2014, 
supplemented by additional language a fortnight later: ceasefire, withdrawal of heavy 
weapons (now with wider buffer zones), monitoring by the Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe, local elections, pardon and amnesty, return of prisoners, humanitarian 
assistance, withdrawal of foreign military and decentralisation of powers for “some areas of 
Donetsk and Luhansk regions” (those separatist-controlled). Most of the provisions of Minsk 
I were violated. 
So what will be different this time? First, there are additional provisions that may be 
significant. Secondly, the strategic political and economic context is categorically different. 
Commitments 
Constitutional reform is pledged by Kyiv for the end of 2015, with decentralisation to include 
special and permanent provisions for the separatist regions. These are somewhat stronger and 
more precise commitments. There is a link to the “reinstatement of full control of the state 
border” of Ukraine by the end of 2015, conditional not only on the reform but also the 
“agreement” of the separatist regions, which themselves are largely controlled by Russia. This 
latter condition must have been a bitter pill for the Ukrainian president, Petro Poroshenko, to 
swallow. Compliance must be regarded as unlikely. 
The economic provisions, however, are potentially not only more plausible but also in due 
course of serious political significance. Public-finance flows between the Ukrainian state and 
the separatist regions — pensions, taxation, energy-utility bills and so on — are to be restored, 
as also the Ukrainian banking system there. This confirms that while Russia was happy to 
absorb Crimea, it is not ready to take on the economic and financial burden of a war-
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devastated eastern Donbass, which has twice the population. Indeed, the separatist regions 
are ten times the size of Transnistria, a frozen conflict zone in Moldova abutting Russia and 
seen by some as a model. 
Therefore the regions have to remain Ukraine’s economic responsibility, and the financial 
resources of the EU and the West have to stand behind Ukraine’s near-bankrupt state. This is 
to going to be another long and complicated story, involving the International Monetary Fund, 
which also on February 12th agreed a second round of funding for Kyiv, its total commitment 
thereby raised to $17.5 billion. The separatist regions, once drained of their war-inspired 
adrenalin, will be back in the normal boring business of economic and financial recovery and 
reconstruction. This will require negotiation with Kyiv and an organised sharing of 
competences in finance and economic relations, whatever it is called (decentralised or 
federalised, Catalonia or Scotland).   
This leads on to the issue, so far barely discussed in the heat of war, of the future economic 
relations between the separatist regions and the rest of Ukraine, with its deep free-trade 
agreement with the EU, and with Russia and thence also the customs union of the Eurasian 
Union and trading relationships with the rest of the world. Poroshenko has made passing 
references to the notion of the separatist regions becoming a free-trade zone. This is a half-
baked idea, which would run into serious problems, like establishing ‘rules of origin’ controls 
for goods sourced there passing into the rest of Ukraine. 
A far better deal would be for all of Ukraine to continue implementing its agreement with the 
EU and then to negotiate a free-trade agreement with the Eurasian Union, including of course 
Russia, replacing the non-functioning such agreement with the latter. The EU, which already 
consults Ukraine and Russia trilaterally, could table this as a logical extension within the 
framework of EU competences of what Merkel and her French counterpart, François Hollande, 
worked on before and at Minsk vis-à-vis political and security relationships. Advances along 
these lines could naturally lead to ending the sanctions regime between the EU and Russia. 
Supply chains 
Local economic geography supports this logic. The separatist regions are big producers of 
metal products, which need heavy port facilities for exports and imports. The port city of 
Mariupul will have to continue to serve that purpose but it falls just outside the separatist 
regions. Mariupul itself has major steel plants, with complex supply chains into the separatist 
regions. 
This is a scenario for returning to sanity and normality. The open question is whether the 
Russian president, Vladimir Putin, would be interested in it — as against careering along the 
track of the embattled authoritarian leader who looks to ‘patriotic’, foreign military adventures 
to sustain his popularity at home. 
The strategic context has changed since Minsk I, in economic and security terms. The sanctions, 
coupled with the huge decline in the oil price, are driving Russia into recession and rapid 
erosion of its financial reserves. Putin’s line seems to be that the recession will be over in two 
years, with recovery of the oil price, and in the meantime Russia has reserves enough. But 
major economic figures in Moscow (such as the former finance minister Alexei Kudrin and 
former economy minister German Gref) are warning that Russia’s economic-policy problems 
go far deeper. The Russian people may be prepared to endure hardship stoically but economic 
isolation while evading the need for modernisation is ultimately unsustainable. 
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Better to get out of the war mode — especially as voices in the US in favour of arming Ukraine 
strengthen, with the appalling vista of escalation closer and closer to direct military 
confrontation between Russia and the US. The full story of Merkel’s whirlwind diplomacy in 
recent days, in Moscow, Washington, Minsk and Brussels, remains to be told. But one can 
readily speculate as to what she said: 
To Putin: unless we get a real peace in Ukraine now, you will get the US arms supplies flowing. 
I, Merkel, am willing to go to Washington to persuade Obama not to do this, if you move on a 
peace. 
To Obama: we must think through the consequences of arming Ukraine. If you do that, it 
would probably trigger a pre-emptive strike by the Russian military before those supplies are 
put in place, sending the tanks to take Mariupul and on to establish a land corridor down the 
Azov Sea coast to Crimea. A siege of Mariupul would mean war on a scale way beyond what 
has been seen — it could become Ukraine’s Stalingrad. Maybe Putin would play this Russian 
roulette more readily than you (Obama). 
But even Putin has to calculate the stakes, and ponder the costs of his NovoRossiya campaign 
and the law of unexpected consequences. And so the 17 hours of non-stop negotiation in Minsk 
through the night of February 11-12th may have been a turning point, when strategic 
perspectives came more vividly into focus while the local details of Minsk II were thrashed 
out. 
The sceptics have a lot of evidence on their side. But the strategic context has changed more 
than the wording of the texts. 
